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A Developmental Study on Assessing the Cybersecurity Competency of
Organizational Information System Users
Abstract

Organizational information system users (OISUs) that are open to cyber threats vectors are contributing to
major financial and information losses for individuals, businesses, and governments. Moreover, technical
cybersecurity controls may be rendered useless due to a lack of cybersecurity competency of OISUs. The main
goal of this research study was to propose and validate, using subject matter experts (SMEs), a reliable handson assessment prototype tool for measuring the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) that comprise the
cybersecurity competency of an OISU. Primarily using the Delphi methodology, this study implemented four
phases of data collection using cybersecurity SMEs for proposing and validating OISU: (a) KSAs, (b) KSA
measures, (c) KSA measure weights, and (d) cybersecurity competency threshold. A fifth phase of data
collection occurred measuring the cybersecurity competency of 54 participants. Phase 1 proposed and
validated three OISU cybersecurity abilities, 23 OISU cybersecurity knowledge units (KU), and 22 OISU
cybersecurity skill areas (SA). Phase 2 proposed and validated 90 KSA measures for 47 knowledge topics
(KT) and 43 skill tasks (ST). Phase 3 proposed and validated the weights for four knowledge categories (KC)
and four skill categories (SC). Phase 4 proposed and validated an OISU cybersecurity competency threshold
(index score) of 80%. Phase 5 of this study measured the cybersecurity competency of 54 OISUs using the
MyCyberKSAsTM prototype cybersecurity competency assessment tool. Phase 5 conducted data analysis by
computing levels of dispersion and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), which indicated that annual
cybersecurity training and job function are significant, providing evidences for significant differences in OISU
cybersecurity competency.
Keywords

Cybersecurity Competency, Cybersecurity Skills, Cybersecurity Knowledge, Cybersecurity Abilities,
Cybersecurity KSAs
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Introduction
The advent of cyberspace has transformed the methods of information
delivery as well as information storage for individuals, businesses, and
governments (Doneda & Almeida, 2015). Due to a minimally regulated digital
infrastructure, the exploitation of cyberspace with malicious intent threatens the
rights of individuals, privacy of individuals, assets of private enterprises, and even
the security of nations (Paulsen, McDuffie, Newhouse, & Toth, 2012).
Essentially, the infrastructure of cyberspace, mostly the Internet, is not secure or
resilient (Garfinkel, 2012). While businesses and governments spend billions of
dollars on security technologies, the user of an information system (IS) remains
one of the most critical cyber vulnerabilities (Huber, Kowalski, Nohlberg, & Tjoa,
2009; Lesk, 2011). Inadequate cybersecurity competency of IS users continues to
result in significant financial, information, and intellectual property loses for
organizations as well as governments (Barlow, Warkentin, Ormond, & Dennis,
2013; Choi, Levy, & Hovav, 2013; Shaw, Chen, Harris, & Huang, 2009).
In an attempt to mitigate the IS user vulnerability in cybersecurity,
organizations have provided security, education, training, and awareness (SETA)
programs to employees (Han, Kim, & Kim, 2017; Warkentin, Straub, &
Malimage, 2012). Such SETA programs are usually provided to all individuals
that require access to organizational networks in an effort to reduce security
breaches or loss of information due to IS user error, ignorance, malicious intent
(insider threat), or negligence (Abawajy, 2012; Choi & Song, 2016; D'Arcy,
Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; DISA, 2015; Han et al., 2017). The Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA) offers cybersecurity awareness training,
named the Cybersecurity Awareness Challenge, for the Department of Defense
(DoD), non-DoD federal employees, and intelligence personnel (DISA, 2015).
Furthermore, the DoD requires that both military personnel and federal civilians
must annually complete the Cybersecurity Awareness Challenge.
A literature review on SETA programs in the private sector and U.S.
government (USG) revealed an apparent lack of documentation regarding the
programs, along with the validity and instrument development of measures of
success (Behrens, Alberts, and Ruefle, 2012; Toth & Klein, 2013). Furthermore, a
literature review on the measurement of cybersecurity competency revealed an
apparent literature gap regarding how to define and measure cybersecurity
competency (Burley, Eisenberg, & Goodman, 2014). Additionally, current
literature acknowledges there is critical lack of information regarding the
assessment of cybersecurity competency, yet it appears to be assumed constantly
by organizational leaders and top management (Assante & Tobey, 2011; Evans &
Reeder, 2010; Johnson, 2012). As such, there was a need to establish a definition
and develop measurement of cybersecurity competency.
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Background
Cybersecurity professionals are a vital component in combating cyber
threats (Paulsen et al., 2012). Cybersecurity professionals are required to have a
high level of combined KSAs (i.e. competency) to create and implement technologies, as well as manage human resources in order to: identify cyber threats and
vulnerabilities, protect information and resources, detect the occurrences of
cybersecurity events, respond to incidents, as well as recover from cybersecurity
events (Paulsen et al., 2012; NIST, 2014). However, most IS users are not
cybersecurity professionals, the majority of IS users are lacking awareness as well
as training in information technology (IT) and cybersecurity (Happ, Melzer, &
Steffgen, 2016; Hazari, Hargrave, & Clenney, 2008).
Lack of cybersecurity competency of IS users is a critical vulnerability to
organizational networks, which is of utmost importance since vulnerabilities are
contributing to substantial financial losses for governments and organizations all
over the world (Choi et al., 2013). To mitigate the cybersecurity KSA shortfalls of
IS users, many companies and governments have instituted initiatives such as
SETA programs or cyber awareness programs (D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009;
DISA, 2015). However, there appeared to be a lack of scholarly literature and
government documentation regarding how to measure the cybersecurity
competency for an organizational IS user (OISU). Furthermore, there appeared to
be a literature void within the body of knowledge regarding how to quantify an
acceptable cybersecurity competency level of an OISU. Therefore, additional
research to establish such a way to quantify an acceptable cybersecurity
competency level of an OISU was necessary (Johnson, 2012; O'Neil, Assante, &
Tobey, 2012; Sabeil, Manaf, Ismail, & Abas, 2011). Thus, the main goal of this
research study was to propose and validate, using subject matter experts (SME), a
reliable hands-on assessment prototype for measuring the combined necessary
KSAs for cybersecurity competency of an OISU. This study intended to build on
the work of Behrens et al. (2012), as well as Toth and Klein (2013), by
developing the MyCyberKSAsTM prototype cybersecurity competency assessment
tool.
The MyCyberKSAsTM prototype cybersecurity competency assessment
tool was in the form of an iPad application or can be run as a Website, with
content that was validated by SMEs, that were used to measure a core set of
required cybersecurity abilities, cybersecurity knowledge units, and cybersecurity
skills that are necessary to pass a cybersecurity competency threshold, as
illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Model of Combined Necessary KSAs for Cybersecurity Competency
Attainment for an Organizational Information System User (OSIU)
As such, when an individual possesses the required cybersecurity abilities, the
increase in cybersecurity knowledge and skills based on experience will reach a
certain level that can be identified as cybersecurity competency threshold. The
intent of the uncovering of the cybersecurity competency threshold is to establish
a minimum index score that needs to be achieved when participating in a
competency assessment (Ahmed, Ishman, Laeeq, & Bhatti, 2013; Jacob & Chalia,
2015). Behrens et al. (2012) proposed a Competency Lifecycle Roadmap (CLR)
for developing and sustaining cybersecurity competencies. The CLR consists of
five phases: assess, plan, acquire, validate, and test readiness. Moreover, Toth and
Klein (2013) noted that all IS users within an organization are in need of
continuous security awareness training. Toth and Klein (2013) also contended that
all IS users are required to possess Cybersecurity Essentials competency. Toth
and Klein (2013) also noted that Cybersecurity Essentials competency ensures an
OISU possesses the desired applied KSA levels to protect information and
systems. However, both studies, while indicating the importance of such a tool
and the need for assessment of cybersecurity competency threshold level, do not
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provide a way to measure such KSAs or propose a minimum threshold level, such
as done in this study (Behrens et al., 2012; Toth & Klein, 2013).
To achieve the main goal, this study addressed five specific research
goals. The first specific goal of this study was to identify the cybersecurity KSAs,
validated by SMEs, which are required to assess cybersecurity competency of
OISUs. The second specific goal of this study was to identify cybersecurity KSA
measures, validated by SMEs, which are necessary to assess cybersecurity
competency of OISUs. The third specific goal of this study was to develop and
validate, using SMEs, a reliable hands-on assessment prototype tool
(MyCyberKSAsTM) that will measure cybersecurity competency of OISUs using
the validated KSAs measures. The fourth specific goal of this study was to
determine the threshold, using SMEs, from the MyCyberKSAsTM hands-on
assessment prototype tool scoring at which cybersecurity competency of OISUs is
reached. The fifth specific goal of this study was to measure the cybersecurity
competency of 50 OISUs and report the results of such assessments. Thus, this
study conducted five phases of data collection. The first four phases conducted
Delphi method data collection from 15-30 SMEs per phase. The fifth phase of
data collection used the MyCyberKSAsTM assessment prototype tool to collect
cybersecurity competency data from 50 OISUs.

Methodology
This study was developmental, in terms of developing the
MyCyberKSAsTM cybersecurity competency assessment prototype tool. This
research study was conducted with Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval
from Nova Southeastern University. This study used the Delphi method with an
expert panel of cybersecurity SMEs to propose and validate the content that
comprised the prototype MyCyberKSAsTM cybersecurity competency assessment
prototype tool. The first step of Phase 1 was to conduct interviews with 5 SMEs
from government and industry to quality check the initial KSA list, identified
from literature as well as USG documents, for accuracy/thoroughness. For Phases
1 thru 4, qualitative and quantitative data collection occurred by using Google®
Forms electronic surveys to gather the expertise of at least 15 SMEs per phase.
When using the Delphi method, each method of each phase builds on the
previously administered instrument. The Google® Forms instruments were
administered to SMEs from government and industry for each Delphi iteration.
This study attempted to use the same SMEs for the duration of data collection.
However, due to anonymity, it was not possible to confirm which SMEs
participated in each phase, but aggregated information about the level of
knowledge, experience, certifications, and additional indicators were used to
ensure the SMEs are indeed cybersecurity experts and somewhat consistent across
the phases. Phase 5 of this study used a sample of 54 OISUs from government and
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industry to test the prototype MyCyberKSAsTM cybersecurity competency
assessment prototype tool. Pre-analysis data screening, a process used to detect
issues with collected data, was conducted on data collection sets from each phase
of this study (Levy, 2006).

Phase 1
Before starting the Phase 1 Survey, this study performed five semistructured SME interviews for evaluation of the initial list of KSAs as identified
from literature review. Appendix A shows the initial KSA list gathered from
literature review and USG documents for the Phase 1 Survey instrument for OISU
cybersecurity KSA proposal and validation. In Phase 1 the SMEs had the ability
to add, modify, or remove KSAs from the initial list, thus, proposing and
validating all required OISU KSAs.

Phase 2
The instrument for Phase 2 presented knowledge units and skill tasks
derived from the validated Phase 1 KSA list to the SMEs as assessment questions
as well as vignettes, which were to be validated as KSA measures. Abilities were
not directly measured since they were assumed based on the surrogate measure of
the individuals’ education indicated, which was collected via the demographics
part of the prototype tool. Surrogating abilities significantly reduced the time
commitment of MyCyberKSAsTM prototype tool participants. To fully measure
the defined cybersecurity abilities of OISUs, external tools would need to be
employed. For example, measuring written comprehension could require the use
of one or more of the following examination batteries: the Gray Oral Reading
Test, the Qualitative Reading Inventory, the Woodcock–Johnson Passage
Comprehension subtest, and/or the Peabody Individual Achievement Test
Reading Comprehension subtest (Keenan, Betjemann, & Olson, 2008). Therefore,
considering the estimated MyCyberKSAsTM prototype tool size, surrogating for
abilities was critical to maintain usability of the tool. Appendix B shows the
knowledge topics (KTs) and skill tasks (STs) from the knowledge units (KUs) and
skill areas (SA) for which assessment questions and vignettes were validated by
SMEs.

Phase 3
The instrument for Phase 3 presented the validated KSAs from Phase 1
and the KSA measures from Phase 2 to acquire KSA weights from the SMEs.
Abilities were not directly measured since they were assumed based on the
surrogate measure of the individuals’ education indicated, which was collected
via the demographics part of the prototype tool. Therefore, abilities were not
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weighted, nor do abilities need to be weighted. The knowledge KSAs were
divided into four knowledge categories, as shown in Appendix B. SMEs were
asked to allocate 100 points among the knowledge categories. The skill KSAs
were also divided into four skill categories as shown in Appendix B. SMEs were
asked to allocate 100 points among the skill categories.

Phase 4
The instrument for Phase 4 requested SMEs proposed cybersecurity
competency threshold values. The Phase 4 survey presented the SMEs with the
results from Phases 1-3. Additionally, the SMEs were given a link to the
MyCyberKSAsTM prototype assessment tool. The SME responses were then
averaged to produce the cybersecurity competency threshold.

Phase 5
The instrument for Phase 5 used participants to test the MyCyberKSAsTM
prototype tool. The prototype tool also collected demographic data that was
needed for data analysis. Demographic questions included: age, gender, job
function, time with current organization, education, annual cybersecurity training,
and cybersecurity certifications.

Proposed Samples
For Phases 1 thru 4, this study was conducted using the Delphi method to
collect data from the expert panel. The expert panel was comprised of SMEs that
are experts regarding the cybersecurity KSAs of OISUs. Skulmoski, Hartman, and
Krahn (2007) noted that Delphi method expert panel sizes can range from 11 to
345. However, Delphi method panel sizes typically are in the range of 7 to 30
experts (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014; Skinner et al., 2015). Therefore, considering an
avoidance of bias, this study selected 15-30 panelists from industry and
government for round one of each phase. When a second phase was required in
Phase 2 Round 2, seven panelists from industry and government were used. Due
to the critical nature of the Phase 1 responses as the foundation for this study,
Phase 1 required a minimum of 30 SME responses. This study attempted to
contact the same group of SMEs to participate in Phases 1 thru 4. All Phases
collected anonymous responses, thus, there was no method for verifying recurring
SME participation, however, the qualifications of the experts across all phases in
aggregated form are comparable. This study accepted cybersecurity certifications,
professional experience, and academic degrees as credentials for the SMEs. This
study solicited government and industry SME participation using emails to
personal and professional contacts that possess cybersecurity credentials via the
LinkedIn© social media Website. Phase 5 used solicitations via FaceBook© to
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gather responses from a sample of 50 OISUs, from government and industry, to
test the prototype MyCyberKSAsTM cybersecurity competency assessment tool.

Results
Semi-Structured Subject Matter Expert (SME) Interviews
This study compiled a list of all KSAs applicable to OISUs from scholarly
literature and USG documents. Before initiating Phase 1 of this study, five semistructured SME interviews were accomplished to ensure the quality of the initial
KSA list. The results of the semi-structured SME interviews identified three
KSAs that were deemed unnecessary in regards to the cybersecurity competency
assessment of an OISU. To eliminate a KSA from the Phase 1 instrument, 60% of
the SMEs needed to recommend removal of the KSA. The KSAs identified for
removal were: advanced written comprehension ability, skill in managing cookie
settings & usage, and knowledge of using file permissions. In addition to
providing feedback of KSA removals from the initial list, the SMEs provided
qualitative feedback on KSA additions and modifications. Specifically, 60% of
the SMEs noted that ‘skill in configuring and using Email in a manner that
prevents sensitive information and PII loss’ needed to be modified. Three of the
five SMEs recognized the need to measure OISU skill with using email, but do
not agree with OISUs needing to configure email as this is a system
configuration/function managed by company policies and IT. Additionally, 80%
of all SMEs noted that ransomware should be assessed within this study.
Moreover, the SMEs advised that knowledge of ransomware is required in some
form, as well as the assessment of skill on how to respond to a ransomware
situation within the workplace. More specifically, a highly qualified SME advised
that in the event of a ransomware notification, ideally an OISU will immediately
unplug their system (without logging off or shutting down the system) and notify
IT of cybersecurity POCs of the incident. The SME explained that some
sophisticated ransomware software seen ‘in the wild’ will scan and encrypt all
systems on the network (including backup/recovery systems), which is not an
immediate process, thus, unplugging from the network can be extremely
beneficial.

Phase 1
Over a two-week period, the Phase 1 survey instrument was sent to 172
SMEs and collected 30 responses for a 17.4% response rate. The SMEs validated
three cybersecurity abilities, 21 knowledge units, and 20 skill areas that are
critical for the cybersecurity competency assessment of an OISU. To be validated,
70% of the SMEs were required to rate a KSA as ‘moderately important’, or five
on a seven point Likert scale. The cybersecurity KSAs that were found in
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literature as well as USG documents, but not validated by the SMEs were: near
vision ability, knowledge of smart card risks, knowledge of Webmail, skill in
peer-to-peer software usage without exploitation by transferring copyrighted
materials/sensitive information/PII, and skill in labeling removable media that
contains sensitive information or PII.

Phase 2
Over a four-week period, the Phase 2 Round 1 survey instrument was sent
to 398 SMEs and collected 16 responses for a 4% response rate. The SMEs
validated 60 of 90 KSA measurement methods. To be validated, 70% of the
SMEs were required to rate a KSA as ‘slightly acceptable’, or five on a seven
point Likert scale. However, if SMEs provided reasoned arguments as to why a
KSA measurement method should be reworked, the KSA measurement method
may not be accepted regardless of the rating achieved. Additionally, if 70% of the
SMEs rated items at five or above, but identified typographical errors, the errors
will be corrected and the KSA measurement method is considered as accepted due
to consensus.
Over a two-week period, the Phase 2 Round 2 survey instrument was sent
to 12 SMEs and received the targeted number of seven responses, for a 58%
response rate. The SMEs validated all 30 of the presented KSA measurement
methods. To be validated, 70% of the SMEs were required to rate a KSA as
‘slightly acceptable’, or five on a seven point Likert scale. The SMEs did not
provide any reasoned arguments as to why a KSA measurement method should be
reworked.

Phase 3
Over an eight-day period, the Phase 3 survey instrument was sent to 54
SMEs and collected 15 responses for a 28% response rate. The SMEs proposed
and validated weights for the four knowledge categories (KCs) and four skill
categories (SCs). The four KCs were: Application Security Knowledge Category
(ASKC), Information Security Knowledge Category (ISKC), Internet and
Network Security Knowledge Category (INSKC), and Physical Security
Knowledge Category (PSKC). The four SCs were: Application Security Skill
Category (ASSC), Information Security Skill Category (ISSC), Internet and
Network Security Skill Category (INSSC), and Physical Security Skill Category
(PSSC). The SMEs also validated weights for Overall Knowledge (OK) and
Overall Skill (OS). The SMEs were asked to divide 100 points among the four
KCs, which were averaged and used as the KC weights. The SMEs were also
asked to divide 100 points among the four SCs, which were averaged and used as
the SC weights. Additionally, the SMEs were asked to divide 100 points between
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OK and OS, which were averaged and used as the OK and OS weights. The
results of Phase 3 are shown in Table 1.

Item

Weight

ASKC
ISKC
INSKC
PSKC
ASSC
ISSC
INSSC
PSSC
OK
OS

21.8%
27.6%
27.3%
23.3%
22.7%
26.3%
27.6%
23.4%
46.1%
53.9%

Table 1. Summary of Phase 3 Results

Phase 4
Over a five-day period, the Phase 4 survey instrument was sent to 39
SMEs and collected 15 responses for a 38% response rate. The SMEs were asked
to propose an overall percentage score between 1-100% for an OISU
cybersecurity competency threshold. SME responses were then assessed and
averaged to produce an OISU cybersecurity competency threshold. The SMEs
proposed the OISU cybersecurity competency threshold of 80%.

Phase 5
Over an eight-day period, the MyCyberKSAsTM prototype tool was
distributed to approximately 569 OISUs and collected 54 responses for a 9%
response rate, mainly due to the extended time required to complete the
assessment (about 45 minutes). Using the 50 OISU sample allowed for data
analysis of cybersecurity competency by each demographic group. A summary of
OISU cybersecurity competency scores is shown in Figure 2. As shown in Figure
2, 69% OISUs were measured as possessing cybersecurity competency for
organizational information systems. Figures 3-9 show the summaries of
cybersecurity competency means and standard deviations by demographic groups.
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Figure 2. Summary of Phase 5 OISU Cybersecurity Competency Scores with OK
and OS components (N = 54)
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Figure 3. Summary of cybersecurity competency means and standard deviations
by age (N = 54)
As shown in Figure 3, the difference between the means for the age groups
is 4%. Standard deviations ranged from 6% (ages 20-29) to 12% (ages 30-39).
The highest mean scores belonged to the 40-49 age group, while the lowest mean
was the 20-29 age group. Figure 3 also shows that the mean score for OISUs over
the age of 40 exceeds the cybersecurity competency threshold, while mean scores
for OISUs under the age of 40 did not meet the OISU cybersecurity competency
threshold. Thus, mean cybersecurity competency scores for OISUs below the age
of 40 did not meet or exceed the cybersecurity competency threshold. It is thus
inferred that as age increases, cybersecurity competency increases.
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Figure 4. Summary of cybersecurity competency means and standard deviations
by gender (N = 54)
Figure 4 illustrates that the sample of 54 OISUs was evenly split between
females and males. The difference in means scores between genders was 3%.
Females mean scores were 80% with a 9% standard deviation, while males mean
scores were 83% with a 10% standard deviation. Using means, both genders as
wholes scored at or above the OISU cybersecurity competency threshold.
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Figure 5. Summary of cybersecurity competency means and standard deviations
by education (N = 54)
As shown in Figure 5, the difference between the lowest and highest
means for the education groups is 9%. Standard deviations ranged from 4% (other
education) to 12% (high school diploma). Figure 5 illustrates that as education is
increased, the mean OISU cybersecurity competency score increases.
Additionally, it is shown that mean scores for respondents with at least a 2-year
college degree meet or exceed the OISU cybersecurity competency threshold. It is
thus inferred that as education increases, cybersecurity competency increases.
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Figure 6. Summary of cybersecurity competency means and standard deviations
by job function (N = 54)
Figure 6 illustrates mean OISU cybersecurity competency scores and
standard deviations by 13 different jobs. The difference between the lowest and
highest means scores was 19%. However, the lowest mean OISU cybersecurity
competency score was from a sample size of one. The lowest standard deviations
of 0% were from the sample sizes of one (security operator, retail, and technical
staff). The highest mean score was 89% by engineers, with a 3% standard
deviation. Figure 6 suggests that there exists a correlation between job function
and IS usage, where gains in IS experience and/or cybersecurity training
positively influences the cybersecurity competency of an OISU.
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Figure 7. Summary of cybersecurity competency means and standard deviations
by time with current employer (N = 54)
Figure 7 illustrates the difference between the lowest and highest means
for the ‘time with employer’ groups is 9%. Standard deviations ranged from 5%
(16-20 years) to 12% (1-5 years). Figure 7 illustrates that for the first 10 years of
employment, as time with the company is increased, the mean OISU
cybersecurity competency score increases. Additionally, it is shown that mean
scores for respondents with 1-20 years with their company meet or exceed the
OISU cybersecurity competency threshold.
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Figure 8. Summary of cybersecurity competency means and standard deviations
for OISUs with and without cybersecurity certification (N = 54)
Figure 8 shows that there was a large difference in the sample of 54 OISUs with
and without cybersecurity certifications. The difference in means scores between
groups was 2%. OISUs without cybersecurity certifications mean scores were
81% with a 10% standard deviation, while cybersecurity certified OISUs mean
scores were 83% with an 11% standard deviation. Using means, both groups
scored at or above the OISU cybersecurity competency threshold.
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Figure 9. Summary of cybersecurity competency means and standard deviations
for OISUs with and without annual cybersecurity training (N = 54)
As shown in Figure 9, the difference between the means for OISUs with
and without annual cybersecurity training is 7%. Standard deviations were 10%
for OISUs without annual cybersecurity training and 11% for those with annual
cybersecurity training. The highest mean scores belonged to OISUs with annual
cybersecurity training, while the lowest mean was for OISUs without annual
cybersecurity training. Figure 9 also shows that the mean score for OISUs with
annual cybersecurity training exceeds the cybersecurity competency threshold,
while mean scores for OISUs without annual cybersecurity training did not meet
the OISU cybersecurity competency threshold.
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Figure 10. Summary of means and standard deviations for KCs, SCs, OK, OS,
and cybersecurity competency scores
Figure 10 shows that the mean OK scores for OISUs was 5% higher than
the mean OS scores. Thus, it appears the OISU participants in this study possess
slightly more cybersecurity knowledge than cybersecurity skill. Additionally, the
mean OISU cybersecurity competency score was 82%, which exceeds the OISU
cybersecurity competency threshold.
ANOVA

Item
Age
Annual cybersecurity training
Cyber certified
Education
Gender
Job function
Time with company

df
4
1
1
4
1
12
6

Mean Square
Between
Groups
49.434
537.414
7.918
146.274
160.373
151.441
72.252

F
0.521
6.491
0.085
1.683
1.781
2.052
0.77

Sig.
0.720
0.014*
0.772
0.169
0.188
0.044*
0.597

Table 4. ANOVA Results by Demographics (N = 54)
* - p <.05, ** - p <.01, *** - p <.001
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Table 4 lists the results of the one-way ANOVA for each demographic
group. The ANOVA for annual cybersecurity training was significant, F(1, 54) =
6.491, p = 0.014, and suggested that cybersecurity competency assessment scores
differed by annual cybersecurity training due to a p-value that is less than 0.05
(Terrell, 2012). The ANOVA for job function was significant, F(12, 54) = 2.052,
p = 0.044, and suggested that cybersecurity competency assessment scores
differed by job function. The one-way ANOVA for age, cybersecurity
certification, education, gender, and time with company were not significant,
which suggested that there is no difference in cybersecurity competency
assessment scores.

Conclusions
Literature has shown that in regards to the cybersecurity KSAs of OISUs,
research tends to focus on a single KSA or small group of KSAs. A
comprehensive list of cybersecurity KSAs for OISUs did not appear to exist in the
body of knowledge. Accordingly, the body of knowledge on OISU cybersecurity
competency did not appear to provide any comprehensive research studies.
Therefore, this study provides valuable information that will assist organizations
with constructing tools to accurately and continually assess the cybersecurity
competency of their OISUs. Such assessments will help organizations identify
strengths as well as weaknesses of OISUs, identify areas in which OISUs require
additional training or supervision, and continually assess OISUs which is
extremely helpful regarding emerging threats. Moreover, if the results of this
study are implemented by organizations, this should reduce the probability of an
OISU being exploited by a cybersecurity threat.
This research study attempts to increase the body of knowledge by
providing an approach for organizations to build their own OISU cybersecurity
competency assessment tools. The results of this study suggest that age, gender,
cybersecurity certification, and time with company are not significant. Moreover,
the results of this study indicates that annual cybersecurity training as well as job
function are significant, and suggest differences in cybersecurity competency
assessment scores. Therefore, a result of this study indicates that annual
cybersecurity training is effective in increasing the OISU cybersecurity
competency. Furthermore, a result of this study suggests that job function causes
positive increases to cybersecurity competency.
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Appendix A
Phase 1 Survey KSAs from literature review and USG documents
KSA
Type

KSA
KSA name
number

Abilities

A1

Near vision ability

A2

Problem sensitivity ability

A3

Written communication ability

A4

Written expression ability

K1

Knowledge of access control

K2

Knowledge of antivirus software

K3

Knowledge of cyber threats

K4

Knowledge of cyber vulnerabilities

K5

Knowledge of cybersecurity POCs

K6

Knowledge of cybersecurity
responsibilities

K7

Knowledge of email encryption

K8

Knowledge of email use

Knowledge

K9
K10

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2017/iss2/2

Knowledge of cyber incident
reporting
Knowledge of information

Author(s)
Campbell et al., 2015;
Trippe et al., 2014
Campbell et al., 2015;
Trippe et al., 2014
Campbell et al., 2015;
Trippe et al., 2014
Campbell et al., 2015;
Trippe et al., 2014
Gross & Rosson, 2007;
Ifinedo, 2012
Arnold et al., 2010; Gross
& Rosson, 2007;
Gross & Rosson, 2007;
Bulgurcu et al., 2010
Gross & Rosson, 2007;
Bulgurcu et al., 2010
Gross & Rosson, 2007;
Parsons et al., 2014
Gross & Rosson, 2007
Gross & Rosson, 2007;
Puhakainen & Siponen,
2010
Parsons et al., 2014;
Barlow et al., 2013
Imgraben et al., 2014;
Parsons et al., 2014
Parsons et al., 2014;
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handling

Skills

K11

Knowledge of information privacy

K12

Knowledge of Internet use

K13

Knowledge of mobile computing
risks

K14

Knowledge of password reuse

K15

Knowledge of phishing

K16

Knowledge of physical security

K17

Knowledge of cybersecurity policy
compliance

K18

Knowledge of sensitive information
and PII

K19

Knowledge of social engineering

K20

Knowledge of social networking
security

K21

Knowledge of smart card risks

K22

Knowledge of strong passwords

K23

Knowledge of Webmail risks

S1

S2

S3
S4
S5
S6
Skill

S7

Skill in preventing unauthorized
access to an IS by controlling access
to systems
Skill in using an antivirus
application to properly update the
software when notified that
antivirus requires an update
Skill in configuring and using Email
in a manner that prevents sensitive
information and PII loss
Skill in cybersecurity incident
reporting
Skill in avoiding suspicious and
malicious Websites when using the
Internet at work
Skill in securely operating mobile
computing devices
Skill in avoiding actions that
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Arpaci, Kilicer, &, 2015
Bulgurcu et al., 2010;
Gross & Rosson, 2007
DISA, 2015; Parsons et al.,
2014
DISA, 2015; Levy &
Ramim, 2016; Parsons et
al., 2014
Ives et al., 2004; Gross &
Rosson, 2007
Bowen et al., 2012; Verma
et al., 2015
DISA, 2015; Newsome &
Jarmon, 2016
Mohammed et al., 2015;
Safa et al. 2016
Gross & Rosson, 2007;
Parsons et al. 2014
Cox, 2012; Gross & Rosson,
2007
DISA, 2015; Parsons et al.,
2014
Ardiley, 2012; DISA, 2015;
Ives et al., 2004
Cox, 2012; Parsons et al.,
2014
Ahmad & Bamnote, 2013;
Broucek & Turner, 2005;
Symantec, 2016
Gross & Rosson, 2007;
Ifinedo, 2012
Dhepe & Akarte, 2013;
Gross & Rosson, 2007;
Ifinedo, 2012
DISA, 2015; Gross &
Rosson, 2007
Imgraben et al., 2014;
Parsons et al., 2014
Carlton et al., 2015; DISA,
2015; Parsons et al., 2014
Botha et al., 2009; DISA,
2015; Parsons et al., 2014
Barlow et al., 2013; DISA,
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S8

S9

S10
S11
S12

S13
S14
S15
S16

S17

S18

increase exposure to malicious code
downloading or execution
Skill in creating using unique
passwords for all user accounts and
logins
Skill in peer-to-peer software usage
without exploitation by transferring
copyrighted materials, sensitive
information, or PII
Skill in avoiding a phishing
attempts of sensitive information
and PII
Skill in physically protecting an IS
from an unauthorized user
Skill in using authorized systems for
sensitive information and PII data
processing as well as transmissions
Skill in labeling removable media
that contains sensitive information
or PII
Skill in using encryption to store
data on approved removable media
Skill in identifying sensitive
information and PII
Skill in avoiding social engineering
attempts of sensitive information
and PII
Skill in using social networking
without divulging sensitive
information and PII
Skill in avoiding a spear-phishing
attempts of sensitive information
and PII

S19

Skill in identifying the spillage of
sensitive information and PII

S20

Skill in creating strong passwords

S21
S22
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Skill in using encryption to transmit
sensitive information and PII when
using Webmail
Skill in avoiding a whaling attempts
of sensitive information and PII

2015

DISA, 2015; Ives et al., 2004

Bishop, 2003; DISA, 2015

Carlton et al., 2015; DISA,
2015; Furnell et al., 2008
DISA, 2015; Dlaminia et al.,
2009; Hinduja & Kooi, 2013
Carlton et al., 2015; DISA,
2015; Knapp & Ferrante,
2012
Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010;
DISA, 2015
Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010;
DISA, 2015
DISA, 2015; Puhakainen &
Siponen, 2010
DISA, 2015; Parsons et al.,
2014
Carlton et al., 2015; DISA,
2015; Gross & Rosson, 2007
Botha et al., 2009; DISA,
2015; Luo et al., 2013
Deshpande et al., 2015;
DISA, 2015; Sugii & Nojiri,
2015
Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010;
DISA, 2015; Mujeye &
Levy, 2013
Ahmad & Bamnote, 2013;
Broucek & Turner, 2005;
Symantec, 2016
DISA, 2015; Furnell et al.,
2008; Hong, 2012
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Appendix B
Phase 2 Survey KSA measures of KTs and STs
Knowledge
Knowledge Unit
Category

Knowledge
Topic
Number

Application
Security
Knowledge
Category

KAV1

Possess knowledge regarding the definition
of antivirus software

KAV2

Possess knowledge regarding keeping
antivirus definitions current through updates

Knowledge of email use

KEU1

Possess knowledge regarding the acceptable
uses of work email

Knowledge of password
reuse

KPR1

Possess knowledge regarding creating unique
passwords for accounts/logins

Knowledge of social
networking security

KSN1

Possess knowledge regarding the
repercussions of posting sensitive
information and PII on social networking
sites

Knowledge of
applications strong
passwords

KSP1

Possess knowledge regarding the properties
of a strong password for applications

Knowledge of Webmail
risks

KWM1

Possess knowledge regarding the risk of
sending/storing sensitive information and PII
on Webmail

KWM2

Possess knowledge regarding the risk of
using work email on public computers

Knowledge of
cybersecurity POCs

KCP1

Possess knowledge regarding the reporting of
cyber incidents to IT or cybersecurity POCs

Knowledge of cyber
incident reporting

KIR1

Possess knowledge regarding the reporting of
cyber incidents regardless of consequence to
company reputation

Knowledge of cyber
incident reporting

KIR2

Possess knowledge regarding the personal
consequences for not reporting cyber
incidents

KIR3

Possess knowledge regarding notifying IT or
cybersecurity POCs of a quarantined virus

Information
Security
Knowledge
Category

Knowledge of antivirus
software
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Knowledge of
information handling

Internet and
Network
Security
Knowledge
Category

KIH1

Possess knowledge regarding the proper
destruction of a CD or DVD

KIH2

Possess knowledge regarding the risks of
using thumb drives and USB device

KIH3

Possess knowledge regarding not posting
sensitive information or PII to public
domains

Knowledge of
information privacy

KIP1

Possess knowledge regarding the
consequences for violating information
privacy laws

Knowledge of
cybersecurity policy
compliance

KPC1

Possess knowledge regarding the
consequences for non-compliance to
company cybersecurity policies

Knowledge of sensitive
information and PII

KSI1

Possess knowledge regarding the
identification of sensitive information
identification

KSI2

Possess knowledge regarding the
identification of PII

KCT1

Possess knowledge regarding the
identification of cyber threats

KCT2

Possess knowledge regarding a capability of
computer viruses

KCT3

Possess knowledge regarding the purpose of
phishing attempts

KCT4

Possess knowledge regarding the purpose of
SPAM

KCT5

Possess knowledge regarding a capability of
computer spyware

KCT6

Possess knowledge regarding a ransomware
attack

KCV1

Possess knowledge regarding the
identification of cyber vulnerabilities

KCV2

Possess knowledge regarding methods to
help protect against insider attacks

KEE1

Possess knowledge regarding the criteria for
when to encrypt an email

Knowledge of cyber
threats

Knowledge of cyber
vulnerabilities

Knowledge of email
encryption
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KP1

Possess knowledge regarding protection
against phishing

KP2

Possess knowledge regarding the goal of
phishing emails with embedded links

KP3

Possess knowledge regarding methods to
avoid phishing Websites

Knowledge of phishing

KP4

Possess knowledge regarding identifying
phishing email narratives (such as free gifts)

Knowledge of using file
permissions

KFP1

Possess knowledge regarding the purpose of
file permissions

Knowledge of Internet
use

KIU1

Possess knowledge regarding when it is
acceptable to use work Internet for personal
use

KIU2

Possess knowledge regarding using peer-topeer file sharing software

KIU3

Possess knowledge regarding when it is
acceptable to visit suspicious non-secured
Websites

KIU4

Possess knowledge regarding the when it is
acceptable to download software

KAC1

Possess knowledge regarding identifying the
risk of writing down passwords

KAC2

Possess knowledge regarding how often
passwords should be changed

KAC3

Possess knowledge regarding identifying the
need to keep passwords confidential

KAC4

Possess knowledge regarding when to
disable/lock computer

KAC5

Possess knowledge regarding restricting
computer access from visitors

KAC6

Possess knowledge regarding understanding
who is responsible if computer access is
compromised

KAC7

Possess knowledge regarding what to do
when access/credential phishing attempts are
received

KAC8

Possess knowledge regarding the what to do
when an access compromise occurs

Knowledge of phishing

Knowledge of Internet
use

Physical
Security
Knowledge
Category

Knowledge of access
control

Knowledge of access
control
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Physical
Security
Knowledge
Category

Knowledge of
cybersecurity
responsibilities

KCR1

Possess knowledge regarding the
identification of cybersecurity
responsibilities

Knowledge of mobile
computing risks

KMC1

Possess knowledge regarding the risks to
drive security when using public Wi-Fi

KMC2

Possess knowledge regarding the risks to
email security when using public Wi-Fi

Knowledge of physical
security

KPS1

Possess knowledge regarding what to do
when an unauthorized person is at a
computer

Knowledge of social
engineering

KSE1

Possess knowledge regarding methods to
protect against social engineering

Knowledge of smart card
risks

KSC1

Possess knowledge regarding the risk of
hacking a lost smart (PKI) card

KAC8

Possess knowledge regarding the what to do
when an access compromise occurs

Skill
Category

Skill Area

Skill Task
Number

Skill Task

Application
Security
Skill
Category

Skill in using an antivirus
application to properly
update the software when
notified that antivirus
requires an update

SAV1

Demonstrate the task of updating antivirus
software when notified that an antivirus
software update is available

Skill in peer-to-peer
software usage without
exploitation by
transferring copyrighted
materials, sensitive
information, or PII

SP2P1

Demonstrate the task of not using peer-topeer software to illegally transfer
copyrighted materials, sensitive information,
or PII

Skill in creating using
unique passwords for user
accounts and logins

SPR1

Demonstrate the task of creating unique
passwords on multiple user accounts or
logins

Skill in creating strong
passwords

SSTP1

Demonstrate the task of creating strong
passwords for user accounts or logins

Skill in using encryption
to transmit sensitive
information and PII when
using Webmail

SWM1

Demonstrate the task to use encryption when
sending sensitive information or PII with
Webmail

Skill in managing cookie
settings and usage

SCU1

Demonstrate the task of adjusting Web
browser settings to prompt for cookies
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Application
Security
Skill
Category

Information
Security
Skill
Category

SCU2

Demonstrate the task of declining cookies
from suspicious Websites

Skill in managing cookie
settings and usage

SCU3

Demonstrate the task of declining cookies
from non-secured Websites

Skill in using email in a
manner that prevents
sensitive information and
PII loss

SES1

Demonstrate the task of not downloading
malicious code

SES2

Demonstrate the task of encrypting an email

SES3

Demonstrate the task of not using work email
for personal use

SES4

Demonstrate the task of enables plain text
and disabling the preview pane in email
client

SES5

Demonstrate the task of using digital
signatures when sending emails

Skill in using email in a
manner that prevents
sensitive information and
PII loss

SES6

Demonstrate the task of virus-scanning email
attachments

Skill in cybersecurity
incident reporting

SIR1

Demonstrate the task of reporting coworker
misconduct that violates a company
cybersecurity policy

Skill in using authorized
systems for sensitive
information and PII data
processing as well as
transmissions

SSI1

Demonstrate the task of not using an
unauthorized system when dealing with
sensitive information and PII

SSI2

Demonstrate the task of not using nonsecured text message to transmit sensitive
information or PII

SSII1

Demonstrate the task of identifying an
address and phone number as PII

SSII2

Demonstrate the task of identifying
proprietary information as sensitive
information

SS1

Demonstrate the task of reporting a spillage
incident

Skill in identifying
sensitive information and
PII

Information
Security

Skill in identifying the
spillage of sensitive
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Skill
Category

Internet and
Network
Security
Skill
Category

information and PII
Skill in labeling
removable media that
contains sensitive
information or PII

SMP1

Demonstrate the task of labeling any
removable media that contains sensitive
information or PII

Skill in using encryption
to store data on approved
removable media

SMU1

Demonstrate the task of using
approved/appropriate removable media

SMU2

Demonstrate the task of encrypting sensitive
information and PII when using removable
media

Skill in avoiding
suspicious and malicious
Websites when using the
Internet at work

SIU1

Demonstrate the task of identifying and
avoiding a malicious popup windows

Skill in avoiding
suspicious and malicious
Websites when using the
Internet at work

SIU2

Demonstrate the task of identifying and
avoiding dubious or pornographic Websites

SIU3

Demonstrate the task of not using credit
cards on non-secured Websites

SMC1

Demonstrate the task of not using links
within emails

SMC2

Demonstrate the task of disabling automatic
downloads in a Web browser

SMC3

Demonstrate the task of virus scanning a
CD/DVD/thumb-drive

SMC4

Demonstrate the task of not forwarding
infected files

SP1

Demonstrate the task of not divulging
sensitive information or PII to a phishing
attempt

Skill in avoiding a
phishing attempts of
sensitive information and
PII

SP2

Demonstrate the task of verifying the identity
of an email sender to prevent the divulging
of sensitive information or PII to a phishing
attempt

Skill in avoiding a spear-

SSP1

Demonstrate the task of not divulging

Skill in avoiding actions
that increase exposure to
malicious code
downloading or execution

Skill in avoiding phishing
attempts of sensitive
information and PII
Internet and
Network
Security
Skill
Category
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phishing attempts of
sensitive information and
PII

Physical
Security
Skill
Category

Physical
Security
Skill
Category

sensitive information or PII to a spear
phishing attack that mimics coworker

SSP2

Demonstrate the task of not divulging
sensitive information or PII to a spearphishing attack that states your name

Skill in avoiding whaling
attempts of sensitive
information and PII

SW1

Demonstrate the task of not divulging
sensitive information or PII to a whaling
attack

Skill in preventing
unauthorized access to an
IS by controlling access to
systems

SAC1

Demonstrate the task of keeping a password
confidential

SAC2

Demonstrate the task of locking a computer
while not in use

Skill in preventing
unauthorized access to an
IS by controlling access to
systems

SAC3

Demonstrate the task of reporting to IT or
cybersecurity POCs that an access
compromise has occurred

Skill in physically
protecting an IS from an
unauthorized user

SPS1

Demonstrate the task of reporting an
unauthorized person on an IS to IT or
cybersecurity POCs

Skill in securely operating
mobile computing devices

SMS1

Demonstrate the task of locking a mobile
device when not in use

SMS2

Demonstrate the task of disabling wireless
capabilities when the IS is using a LAN

SMS3

Demonstrate the task of encrypting sensitive
information or PII when using a mobile
device such as a laptop

SMS4

Demonstrate the task of disabling wireless
capabilities when the mobile device is not in
use

SSN1

Demonstrate the task of using a social
network without divulging PII

SSN2

Demonstrate the task of using a social
network without divulging sensitive
information

SSE1

Demonstrate the task of identifying and
avoiding social engineering attempts by text
messages

Skill in using social
networking without
divulging sensitive
information and PII

Skill in avoiding social
engineering attempts of
sensitive information and
PII
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SSE2

Demonstrate the task of identifying and
avoiding social engineering by vishing
surveys

SSE3

Demonstrate the task of identifying and
avoiding social engineering by public
conversations
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